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Abstract: Identifying cyberattack vectors on cyber supply 
chains (CSC) in the event of cyberattacks are very 
important in mitigating cybercrimes effectively on Cyber 
Physical Systems CPS. However, in the cyber security 
domain, the invincibility nature of cybercrimes makes it 
difficult and challenging to predict the threat probability 
and impact of cyber attacks.  Although cybercrime 
phenomenon, risks, and treats contain a lot of 
unpredictability’s, uncertainties and fuzziness, 
cyberattack detection should be practical, methodical and 
reasonable to be implemented. We explore Bayesian Belief 
Networks (BBN) as knowledge representation in artificial 
intelligence to be able to be formally applied probabilistic 
inference in the cyber security domain. The aim of this 
paper is to use Bayesian Belief Networks to detect 
cyberattacks on CSC in the CPS domain. We model 
cyberattacks using DAG method to determine the attack 
propagation. Further, we use a smart grid case study to 
demonstrate the applicability of attack and the cascading 
effects. The results show that BBN could be adapted to 
determine uncertainties in the event of cyberattacks in the 
CSC domain. 
Keywords: Cyber Physical System, Cyber Attacks, Cyber 
Supply Chain Threats, Bayesian Belief Network,
Cybercrime.
I. Introduction 
The emergence of CPS in the supply chain domain 
has enhanced productivity and global demand and 
supply [1]. CSC has evolved over time and have 
improved business processes amongst organizations 
and third party vendors as well as the ability to 
incorporate electronic transactions with banking 
services. The autonomous nature of CPS requires real-
time decision making and real-time information 
availability using agents. However, that has brought 
with it a significant upsurge in cyberattacks and threat 
agents. Recent CPS attacks include Wanna Cry 
Ransomware attack 2017, that infected several 
companies and energy sectors companies worldwide 
[2]. Ukraine Power Grid attack 2015, caused many 
homes and businesses to be without electricity. [3]. 
Saudi Aramco cyberattack 2017, an electric grid was 
halted from operation by cyber attackers at the Saudi 
Aramco power station [4]. There are several methods 
that have been deployed to detect cyberattacks such as 
integrating the threat modeling and attack vectors [1] 
[5] [6] and using case studies and vulnerability 
assessment methods to determine how threats 
propagate. However, in the cyber security domain, the 
invincibility nature of cybercrimes makes it difficult 
and challenging to predict the threat probability and 
impact of cyberattacks.  Although cybercrime 
phenomenon, risks, and treats contain a lot of 
unpredictability’s, uncertainties and fuzziness, we 
consider using BBN and subjective judgment to provide 
a practical, methodical and reasonable approach to 
implement cyberattack detection on CSC.  
The aim of this paper is to use Bayesian Belief 
Networks to detect cyberattacks on CSC in the CPS 
domain. The novelty contribution is to improve CSC 
security. To achieve that we model cyberattacks using 
DAG method to determine the attack propagation. 
Further, we use a smart grid case study to demonstrate 
the applicability of attacks and cascading effects. The 
results show that BBN could be adapted to determine 
uncertainties in the event of cyberattack in the CSC 
domain.
II. Related Works 
This section discusses related works in the CSC 
security domains, the start of the art in CPS 
developments and recent attacks. Ref [7] discussed 
attack scenarios that outline how cyberattacks and 
cybercrimes could jeopardize the security of supply 
chain systems on EU economies including socio-
economic, political and ideological impacts. Ref [8]
proposed a method of identifying cybercrimes and risks 
on the smart grid business application system by using 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach to 
identify cybercrime and risk on CPS that provides 
specific risk mitigation goals. Ref [9] proposed a design 
and secure network protocols to achieve efficient and 
secure information delivery in the smart grid 
architecture by reviewing security requirements, 
network vulnerabilities and attack countermeasures. 
Ref [1] proposed a discrete probability method for 
calculating the cyberattack and effectively analyze the 
threats using conditional probabilities to determine 
attack propagation and cascading effects on the CSC 
system. Ref [10] proposed an IADS and CCADS and 
applied a method to validate the anomaly detection 
capabilities on CPS using the IEEE bus 39 system by 
collecting attack information and analyzing the 
predefined relationships using a similarity index [10].
Ref [11] proposed a security mechanism that decreases 
the severity if cyber-attacks by employing a divers set 
of methods reduces repetition of a single vulnerability. 
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The authors focused on the allocation of diver’s security 
mechanisms and tried to increase the security of the 
cyber assets located within the electronic security 
perimeter of a substation by and also used a game 
theory to analyze the vulnerability assessment for 
power grid network. Ref [12] evaluated cybersecurity 
risk of power CPS by using modified hypergraph that 
determines the probability of successful cyberattacks 
on Substation Auto Systems (SAS) and their 
countermeasures. 
  
A. The rationale for Using BBN in CSC Attack 
Detection 
BBN is used as probabilistic inference to solve 
issues of uncertainty. It is used in a cybersecurity 
domain and Artificial Intelligence (AI) concepts where 
domain knowledge is not clear.  Further Based on the 
Bayes Theorem, BBN provides an effective technique 
for reasoning and modeling uncertainties in safety 
critical system domains.  [13, 14]. Similarly, Reference 
[15], posits that the BBN theory has been used in 
scientific disciplines to judge the relative validity of 
hypothesis in the face of noise, sparse, uncertainty, and 
to adjust the parameters of a specific model. We use 
conditional probabilities method and causality 
principles with cyberattack scenarios and assumptions 
(subjective judgment) to determine the event and 
cascading effects. 
III. Proposed Approach 
Expert opinions provide us the mixed method 
approach of a positivist and interpretative research 
philosophy in a subjective manner. Ref [16]. The 
interpretive approach provides understand the human 
thought and actions in a social and organizational 
context. Ref [17] posit that interpretive approaches 
provide a greater scope to address issues of influence 
and impact. We integrate subjective expert judgments 
and Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) for detecting CSC 
attacks. This section provides an overview of Bayesian 
Belief Network (BBN) and subjective expert judgment.
A. Subjective Expect Judgment 
Subjective Interpretation has the potential to 
produce deep insight into the cybersecurity 
phenomenon including the management of CSC 
systems development and security. The heterogeneous 
nature of CPS among components and its 
interoperability within the mechanisms itself results in 
a lack of understanding of cyber threats. We model the 
uncertainties involve in cyberattack using conditional 
probability distribution which maps with the expert 
opinion.  
IV. Bayesian Belief Network Process 
This section presents the concepts for the proposed 
approach. Our work contributes to using BBN to model 
and analyzing cyberattacks for the CSC domain.  
A.     Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) 
BBN is a mathematical model that depicts the 
interrelationship of several events by defining the 
conditional probability between events. BBM is 
presented as a direct acyclic graph (DAG) together with 
an associated set of probability tables [14]. The 
concepts include how to describe and represent the 
relationship in the presences of uncertainties as well as 
how to manipulate such knowledge to make inferences. 
The DAG graphs consist of two portions: nodes 
representing the variables and arcs representing the 
causal/relevance dependencies between these variables. 
The nodes are of variable types, i.e. parent or 
observable, target and intermediate nodes are denoted 
as stochastic (randomly changing over time) or decision 
variables where multiple variables are often used to 
determine the state of each node. Each state of the 
individual node is expressed using probability density 
functions [15]. Probability density specifies the 
confidence in various outcomes of a set of variables 
connected to a node and depends conditionally on the 
status of the parent nodes at the incoming edges. For 
instance. The Figure below depicts concepts of 
cybercrime and the types of attack and causal but in 
between the attack and causals remains the 
uncertainties that exist due to lack of expert knowledge 











Figure 1. Relationship in the Presences of Uncertainties 
The figure below depicts that lack of expert 
opinion and lack of attack modeling of vectors 
increasing the likelihood of supply chain requirements 
errors and consequence impact is a Cyber Physical 
Systems (CPS) threat landscape. To ensure secure CSC 
systems, BBN techniques are used to predict the lack of 
expert judgment and lack of attack vector modeling as 
the root cause of the parent nodes.  
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Figure 2. Bayesian Belief Network 
B.  Challenges of Modeling Cybercrimes 
The most challenging aspect of cybercrimes is 
the complex nature of modeling the various threat and 
uncertainties. BBN allows us to model and reason about 
the uncertainties and forces the assessor to assume all 
assumptions about the impact. We factor in causes that 
are responsible and influence of attacks wherein serial
attacks, X influences Y and Y influence Z 
conditionally. In Divergent attacks X influence Y and 
X concurrently. Then in convergent attacks X and Y 
includes X.  We adopt the Bayes rule [19] to 
demonstrate how to model the uncertainties as follows. 
C. Bayes Rule  
In Bayes rule, joint probabilities of two events 
X&Y are expressed as  
P(XY)  =  P(X\Y)P(X)          1 
               = P(Y\X)P(Y)          2 
  
We assume that one of the events is the 
Hypothesis, H, and the other is Data D. We want to 
judge the relative truth of the hypothesis given the data. 
According to the Bayes rule, we calculate this rule using 
the relationship below: 
P(H\D) = ( \ ) ( )( )   3 
The formula P(H\D) is the likelihood function and it 
assesses the probability of the observed data arising 
from the hypothesis. We will insert the value as we 
gather the expert data to determine the hypothesis. The 
P(H) represents the Prior knowledge of the subjective 
expect judgment before the data are considered. P(D) is 
obtained by integrating P(D\H)P(H) overall H. The 
P(H\D) is the information that reflects the probability of 
the hypothesis after consideration of the data.   
D. The Smart Grid  
The smart grid is made up of Generation, 
Transmission, and Distribution System. The 
infrastructure is made up of the backbone of the 
SCADA system, ITU and EIDs that connected to 
wireless communication network technologies that 
connect the physical system to the cyber physical 
systems. For detailed discussion refer to [9 - 11].  Out 
model emphasis on the cyberattacks motive and intent. 
We identify, three threat actor. Threat Actor 1, could 
attack from a remote source, threat actor 2 could attack 
from the vendor's system gateway, threat actor 3, could 
attack from the substation and threat actor for may be 
an internal attacker.     
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Figure 3. Smart Grid Model 
E. The scenario of a Malware Attack on the CSC 
An organization has purchased and installed 
software that is bought off the shelf on the system. The 
software integrates with suppliers, distributors, third 
party vendors and individual customers on the supply 
inbound and outbound chains. Unknown to the 
organization, malware has been inserted as a spyware 
program in the software that downloads itself whenever 
the user is prompted to update their software. 
Whenever, the users on the supply chain click on the 
download to update, steals password details that 
provide the threat actor access to takes advantage of 
user data and is able to manipulate data the CSC chain 
systems.    
V. Modeling the Attack Using Bayesian Belief 
Network
In this section, we use the scenario in section IV 
(E) above to model out the attack. From the case study, 
two events can cause an attack on the CSC: Cyberattack 
and cybercrime. Cyberattacks are the physical actions 
malware, XSS, RAT, session high jacking against the 
supply chain infrastructure and system resources. 
Whereas, Cybercrimes are the actual crimes committed 
after gaining access to manipulate, delete, alter, redirect 
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or compromise the system and cause further 
exploitations including intellectual property theft, 
industrial espionage, and advanced persistent threats. 
A. Conditional Probability Theory 
Cyberattacks have a direct effect on cybercrimes, 
in that in an event of cybercrime, the threat actor has 
direct access to manipulate the CSC system. This 
situation can be modeled with the BBN [16] as follows.
We use conditional probability theory to determine the 
set of discrete and mutually dependent random 

















































Figure 4. Conditional Probability Table 
For our study, we, define the joint probability function 
as:   
Pr(M, A, C) = Pr(M|A, C) Pr(A|C) Pr(M)  4 
Where: 
A = Cyberattack (True/False),  
C = Cybercrime (True/False) 
M = Manipulation (True/False)  
We use this model to answer uncertainty questions 
about an event of an attack, given the event as an effect 
of an inverse probability. For instance we as the 
question: 
What is the probability that there is manipulation on the 
CSC, given that there is a cyber attack, by using the 
conditional probability formula in table 1 and summing 
up to overall the nuisance variables?  Pr( = | = ) = (  ,   )    ( ) = ∑ ( , )   (  ,   , )∑ , ( , )   (  ,   , )  5 
Using the expansion of the joint probability 
function Pr(M, A, C) and the conditional probabilities 
table in figure 4, we evaluate each term in the sums in 
the numerator and denominator: For example. 
Pr(M = T, A = T, C = T) =  
Pr(M = T|A = T, C = T) Pr(A = T|C = T) Pr(M,T)    6 
= + 0.99 x 0.01 x 0.2 
The numerical results: Pr( = | = )= 0.00198  +  0.15840.00198 +  0.288 +  0.1584 +  0.0= 891 2491 = 35.77%          7
We ask an interventional question such as:  
What is the probability that the cybercrime occurred,
given that attack was initiated by an internal threat 
actor?  
We answer to try to answer the question is directed by 
the previous intervention of the joint probability 
distribution function i.e: 
Pr(A, C\do (M = T)) = Pr(A\C)P(C)    8 
To answer that: we removing the factor Pr(M\A, 
C) from the pre-intervention distribution obtaining by. 
The do operator forces the value to Manipulation (M) 
to be true. The probability of Cyberattack is not affected 
as the internal attacker does not need to attack 
externally.   
Pr(A\do(M = T) = Pr(C)   9 
To predict the impact of detecting the cyberattack, we 
model the probability as:  
Pr(C, M\do(A = T)) = Pr(C) Pr(G\C, A=T) 10 
Our result show that with the formula Pr(A = T\C)
removed showing that the cyberattack affects the CSC 
system but not the cybercrime.  
B.   Malware Threat Propagation  
There are so many uncertainties in the cyber 
attack. Therefore, for our study, we identify whether a 
malware attack was initiated on the CSC through 
manipulation during production or during distribution.
The purpose of malware is to exploit vulnerable spots 
on the network system.  We use the adversary attack, 
techniques and procedures (TTP) to determine the 
actual sources of a worm or virus and whether the cause 
of the attack on the CSC was initiated through malware 
installed or malware executed program. We equate 
malware installed to be from a virus, botnet, spyware or 
rootkit attack and malware executed to be through email 
phishing or spear phishing attacks.   
40
C. Malware Installed 
Malware installed are virus embedded within the 
host network and replicates itself within the other 
systems on the supply chain. When the user executes 
the host program infected with the virus, the virus code 
executes first, then the virus looks for another 
executable program and creates another virus, 
propagates to other nodes on the supply chain causing a 
cascading effect.  
D. How Virus Replicates / Cascade 
1. A computer user executes program A, which 
is infected with a virus.  
2. The program A executes and identifies B 
which could be a third party vendor node.  
3. After finding another executable code, 
program B create a new version of A infected 
with the virus. 
4. The virus passes control to A on the supply 
chain to infect C and D as well.  



































Figure 5. Malware Executable 
E. Malware Executable 
The malware executable is the viruses attacks sent 
through email phishing or spear phishing. Here, the 
threat actor sends an email to a targeted group (spear 
phishing) with a caption that may be relevant to the 
business process. The user unaware of the virus open 
and read the email with an attachment which has a 
virus, the virus attaches itself to the user's email address 
book, infect and cascade to others on the network.   
1. Attacked send a spear phishing email to a targeted 
group on the organization supply chain 
2. A user reads the email and opens the attachment 
which contains a virus 
3. The virus executes itself and attached itself to the 
user's email address book  
4. The virus sends emails to others containing 



























Figure 6. Malware Installed Spear Phishing Email 
Attack 
F. Detecting Malware Propagation  
In the case of a malware attack on the 
organization system, we follow the TTP 
method by analyzing and identifying the 
following in a CSC environment:  
1. Category of malware: We analyze the CSC 
system to identify the course of attack whether it 
was Virus, Trojan, Rootkit, and Botnet as the 
adversary can use different methods to get to the 
system.  
2. Sources of the malware:  The source of the attack 
gives us an indication of the vulnerable spots that 
were exploited such as Spear Phishing, Redirect 
Script, XSS.  The adversary used a spear phishing 
email to target his victims. Or attached malware 
to a website link that the customers use often so 
that when they visit the website it will download 
and provide the attacker the access.  
3. The subject of the malware: The name the 
adversary uses in the subject to prevent the victim 
from suspecting them. Adversary’s use 
catchy subjects that easily get the 
attention of their victims. Most victims 
often do not pay particular attention to the 
source of an email especially the managers 
who mostly read their emails on the go.  
4. Vector: RAT attack to penetrate to the victim 
system. Cross-site scripting and cross (XSS) site 
request forgery attacks are most embedded in the 
victims URLs from the victims end in the case of 
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XSS or from the web server end in the case of 
(XSRF) attacks.  
5. Categories of attachments and specific 
attachments (Malware Installed or Malware 
Executed): Here we analyze the attachments to 
determine whether the attack was a malware 
installed from links that were downloaded or from 
an email attachment that the victim opened 
unaware.  
6.  Analyze and Evaluate the Malware: We compare 
the extent of the malware attack to the 
organizational resources and that of the third party 
vendors in order to determine the probable risks    
VI. SUMMARY 
The invincibility nature of cyberattacks and 
cybercrimes on CSC system and the heterogeneous 
nature of CPS systems generate a  lot of uncertainties in 
predicting supply chain attacks, risks, and impacts. The 
uncertainties involve a lot of factors including lack of 
understanding of cyber threat intelligence and the attack 
life cycle such as attack pattern, attack prerequisites, 
attack vectors, TTP and threat modeling. Other factors 
include the inabilities to align organization goal, assets, 
requirements and business process to the cyber threat 
intelligence for strategic management understanding 
and accurate security controls. We have modeled 
cyberattack using BBN in the AI domain to provide a 
base to understand CSC threats and causalities relative 
to the uncertainties.  Similarly, the difficulty is due to 
the evolving nature of cybercrimes, cyber threat 
landscape, and evolving organizational landscapes. 
Therefore subjective judgment supports attack 
modeling, threat indicators, information sharing, and 
supply chain security controls. We have used a case 
study to model threat probabilities using BBN node to 
determine the likelihood of an attack and its cascading 
impact. Further, the study will include using Machine 
Learning and CTI approach to model CSC attacks.  
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